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RECENT DECISIONS
Law, relates to a tax allocable to the share of the surviving spouse
theretofore determined." In re Peters' Will 275 App. Div. 950, 89
N. Y. S. 2d 651, 652 (2d Dep't 1949), affirming, 88 N. Y. S. 2d 142
(Surr. Ct. 1949). Apparently the First Department has, in the
instant case, adopted that statement as a logical resolution of the
two statutes.
However, if a testator directs that taxes be paid from the
residuary estate, the apportionment statute by its own terms
does not apply and the limitation on the widow's maximum share
is calculated after deducting taxes on the estate as a whole. In re
Ryan's Will 280 App. Div. 410, 114 N. Y. S. 2d 1 (1st Dep't 1952).
As the right of election is by definition intended to guarantee
the widow a minimum amount regardless of her husband's wishes,
it seems anomalous that the testator be allowed to reduce the
statutory grant by providing for payment of taxes.
Though the court in the instant case has reached a just result
by interpreting "any estate tax" to mean the tax allocable to the
widow's share of the estate, it is submitted that the legislature
should resolve the conflict with the definition of the Ryan case
that the same words mean all estate taxes.
Irving Brott
WILLS - RIGHT OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILD UNDER
ANTI LAPSE STATUTE
Testator named his sister residuary legatee of his will. She
predeceased him leaving as her only survivor a child allegedly
born out of wedlock. Testator's two brothers, who are his sole
heirs, contend the bequest lapsed and they take by intestacy. Held:
assuming illegitimacy, such a child is a child within the meaning of
the "anti lapse" statute. In re Anonymous' Estate, 204: Misc.
1045, 126 N. Y. S. 2d 749 (Surr. Ct. 1953).
Under the laws of intestacy, an illegitimate child may take
from his mother providing there axe no other lawful issue. N. Y.
DECEDENT ESTATE LAw § 83 (13); In re Anonymous, 165 Misc. 62,
300 N. Y. Supp. 292 (Surr. Ct. 1937). However he may not take
from his father, In re Vincent's Estate, 189 Misc. 489, 71 N. Y. S.
2d 165 (Surr. Ct. 1947) ; nor his mother's collateral relatives either
as a direct heir or as a representative. Matter of Cady, 257 App.
Div. 129, 12 N. Y. S. 2d 750 (3d Dep't 1939), aff'd, 281 N. Y.
688, 23 N. E. 2d 18 (1939). On the other hand, an adopted child
may take from his foster mother or father even though there are
natural children. N. Y. DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAw § 115; but he
may not take from the collaterals of his foster parents. Hopkins
v. Hopkins, 202 App. Div. 606, 195 N. Y. Supp. 605 (4th Dep't
1922), aff'd, 236 N. Y. 545; 142 N. E. 277 (1923).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
The "anti lapse" statute provides that when a devise or be-
quest is made to a child, or decedent, or brother, or sister, of the
testator and such legatee or devisee predeceases the testator leav-
,tug a child or other descendant the devise or legacy shall not lapse
but will vest in such child or descendant of the legatee or devisee, as
if such legatee or devisee had survived the testator and had died
intestate. N. Y. DECEDENT EsTATE LAw § 29.
The issue before the court in the instant case was whether an
illegitimate child is entitled to the benefit of the "anti lapse"
statute as a child of a legatee or devisee. An adopted child has
been held to be such a child upon the grounds that § 115 of the
Domestic Relations Law treats an adopted child as a natural child
and in addition such a child would be an heir of his foster parents
under the laws of intestacy. In re Walter's Estate, 270 N. Y. 201,
200 N. E. 786 (1936).
Petitioners in the instant case argued that since the illegiti-
mate child would be taking from his mother's collaterals the "anti
lapse" statute does not apply. The surrogate dismissed this con-
tention by following the reasoning laid down in, In re Walter's
Estate, supra, and stated that the "anti lapse" statute provides
that a child shall inherit ". . . as if such legatee or devisee had
survived the testator and died intestate." Here, if the mother had
survived the testator and died intestate, the illegitimate child
would have been deemed her child or heir since there are no other
lawful issue. N. Y. Decedent Estate Law § 83 (13). He therefore
concluded that since this illegitimate child would have taken under
the laws of intestacy, he comes within the express terms of the
"anti lapse" statute and is a child within its meaning. Accord,
Goodwin v. Colby, 64: N. H. 401, 13 Atl. 866 (1887); Cherry v.
Mitchell, 108 Ky. 1, 55 S. W. 689 (1900).
It should be noted that by this interpretation the laws of
intestacy and the "anti lapse" statute reach different results. If
the testator in the instant case had died intestate the illegitimate
child could not take his mother's intestate share as her representa-
tive, Matter of Lauer, 76 Misc. 117, 136 N. Y. Supp. 325, (Surr. Ct.
1912), whereas a lawful child could, N. Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW
§ 83 (6) ; but because there is a will the illegitimate may now inherit
her bequest under the "anti lapse" statute. See In re Walter's
Estate, supra, where the reasoning of the court leads to a similar
result where adopted children axe concerned.
It is the opinion of this writer that the mere fact that an
illegitimate child may take from his mother by intestacy does not
conclusively establish his status as a child within the meaning of
the "anti lapse" statute. However, it is submitted that the surro-
gate reached a proper result by following the reasoning of the
Walter's case. Harry T. Dixon
